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Abstract
In this article the Western Sahara conflict and Africa’ dealings with it is analyzed. 
Since the formation of the first continental organization in the Western Sahara, 
conflict has been on the agenda. However, that through admission of the SADR, 
which Morocco later reacted by cessation of membership became crisis for OAU. As 
Morocco becomes a member of the AU like SADR, this crisis became acute as those 
two countries do not recognize each other. AU, SADR and Rabat have different 
suggestions for the conflict which making the unity questionable. However, the crisis 
has not threatened the existence and functioning of the OAU and the AU yet. 
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Öz
Bu makalede Batı Sahra sorunu ve Afrika’nın bu sorunla nasıl baş ettiği 
incelenecektir. Kıtasal ilk örgütlenmenin kurulmasından bu yana Batı Sahra sorunu 
kıta gündemindedir. SADC’nin üyeliğinden sonra Fas’ın tepki göstererek üyelikten 
ayrılmasıyla konu ABT için krize dönüşmüştür. Aralarında SADC’nin de bulunduğu 
AfB üyelerine Fas’ın dahil olmasıyla bu sessiz kriz akut krize dönüşmüştür; çünkü 
SADC ve Fas birbirlerini tanımamakta fakat aynı kurum içinde yer almaktadır. 
AfB, SADC ve Fas sorunun çözümü için kurumun diğer üyelerinin olduğu gibi farklı 
önerilere sahiptir. Dolayısıyla, bu kriz hem AfB’nin hem de Afrika’nın bütünlüğünü 
sorgulatacaktır. Fakat sessizken sonradan akut haline gelen kriz bugüne kadar ABT 
ve AfB’nin varlığını, fonksiyonunu ciddi olarak tehdit etmemiştir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Üyelik, AfB, Batı Sahra, Kriz, Fas.
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Introduction
The Western Sahara issue has become a crisis for the African 
continental framework once again, due to Morocco’s accession to 
the African Union (AU). In addition to the Western Sahara crisis, 
Rabat’s membership bid constitutes another crisis for the African 
continental framework. Concerning the Western Sahara conflict, 
Rabat and the African continental political framework have had 
“troubled relationship”.1 In spite of this “troubled nature”, several 
African states have had positive relations with Rabat. There was 
already an existing crisis because of the Western Sahara conflict, 
but now Morocco’s membership constitutes another crisis. That is 
to say the silent Western Sahara crisis between Morocco and the 
Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) becomes an acute 
crisis with Morocco’s membership. In another words, the crisis 
stems from the fact that the AU, Morocco and the SADR have 
pursued different policies over the membership issue.
Morocco is one of the most crucial states in African politics. Its 
political relations with the West, its problematic relations with 
Algeria, its economical weight can be identified as indicators for 
her place and importance in the continent. However, for a long 
period of time, Morocco was outside the continent’s political, 
institutive and administrative framework. She left its predecessor, 
the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in the 1980s. Yet, in 2016 
Morocco’s attituted has changed just as her relations with Africa’s 
administrative and political structure: she declared its demand to 
be an African Union member. 
Although the Western Sahara is situated in the North Africa, 
its articulation with the right of self-determination broadens 
the scope of the issue to the whole continent. Among direct and 
indirect parties of the conflict it has remained as a crisis, but 
foreign relations of these actors and the right of self-determination 
broaden the crisis to the whole continent. Earlier the OAU and now 
the AU have become battle ground or contested place for the parties 
1  Terence McNamee et al., Morocco and the African Union: Prospects for Re-Engagement and 
Progress on the Western Sahara, Discussion Paper 1, The Brenthurst Foundation, 2013, p. 20.
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of the Western Sahara conflict. The Western Sahara crisis that 
manifested itself in the SADR’s and now Morocco’s membership 
crisis has both legal and political dimensions. Because African 
political, institutional and administrative framework’s policies 
concerning Western Sahara resulted in Morocco’s decision to leave 
the continental structure and till her admission the issue remained 
as the primary reason for her voluntarily exclusion. Despite this 
fact the differences still exist between the Kingdom and the AU.
Morocco’s demand to be a member of the African Union 
highlights the Western Sahara issue’s effect on the African politics. 
The political and strategic balance within the AU, relations between 
leading states of the institution, Moroccan-African relations and 
policies of the AU and African states on the Western Sahara issue 
are the striking points regarding the crisis. Moreover, it recalls the 
significance and the role of international law on the resolution of 
this Maghrebi problem. 
The Western Sahara: by History, by Politics and by 
Legal Aspects
With the termination of the Spanish governance over the region 
in 1963, the UN listed the Western Sahara as non-self-governing 
territory.2 The same year the UN Decolonization Committee 
included it in its list of the areas to be decolonized. Till that day 
the Western Sahara issue has been on the list remaining the sole 
and last issue regarding Africa’s decolonization process according 
to the UN. Henceforth, it has not only legal, political but also 
symbolic and historical significance for the African political and 
legal institutions. 
Morocco and the Polisario Front (Frente Popular de Liberación 
de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro, PF)/SADR have been the two 
conflicting parties with opposite aims. Till the 1991’s ceasefire, 
Rabat and the PF were at war to have ultimate sovereignty over 
2  “Western Sahara 2015 Profile”, The UN, http://www.un.org/en/decolonization/pdf/
Western%20Sahara%202015%20profile_15Dec2015.pdf, (Date of Accession: 24.04.2016). 
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the Western Sahara. After Spain’s withdrawal from the region, 
the SADR was declared as an independent state by the Front in 
February 1976 in the refugee camps in Algeria.3
 The SADR has had two goals on different fronts: national 
liberation and “a diplomatic campaign to secure international 
recognition of the new state.”4 The PF has aimed total 
independence of the Western Sahara, and has acclaimed that it 
has been the representative of Sahrawi refugees. The SADR and 
the PF have based these claims on the right of self-determination 
which universally accepted by the international law. The Front’s 
self-determination claims are based on non-self-governing 
territory concept5 and the Western Sahara’s status in the UN’s 
decolonization list. Henceforth the PF, has demanded application 
of referendum with independence as an option to implement the 
right of self-determination. 
On the other hand, from Morocco’s point of view the Western 
Sahara problem has to be solved in accordance with the principles 
of inviolability of its borders and preservation of its territorial 
unity. Morocco, based on its interests and political framework, 
has politically revaluated these two fundamental principles of 
international law, Africa’s customary law and jurisprudence. She 
has based its claims on political dimensions since political theses 
rather than legal ones conform to its resolutions like the autonomy 
plan. 
Morocco has put several suggestions forward to solve the 
Western Sahara issue. The suggestions were based on the 
internal options of the right of self-determination like autonomy 
and development plans for the region. According to Moroccan 
autonomy plan dated 2006, “Autonomous Saharan Region” will be 
3  Anthony G. Pazzanita, “Legal Aspects of Membership in the Organization of African Unity: 
The Case of the Western Sahara”, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, 7(1), 
1985, p. 128.
4  Gina J. Naldi, The Organization of African Unity: An Analysis of Its Role, Monsell, New York 
1999, p. 54.
5  “Right of Non-Self-Governing Territories to Self-Determinastion Reaffirmed, As Fourth 
Committee Approves Nine Decolonization Texts”, United Nations: Meetings Coverage and 
Press Releases, http://www.un.org/press/en/2002/gaspd238.doc.htm, (Date of Accession: 
12.12.2014).
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created where judiciary, executive and legislative autonomy, and 
several other issues like infrastructure will be under the control 
of local administrative unit.6 However, defense and foreign affairs 
will be under the Moroccan control. To Rabat, this plan should 
be elaborated in conjunction with “free association”. Morocco has 
another proposal named as “Southern Provinces”. It is based on 
decentralization and development of the region and several regions 
of the Kingdom for “integrating the south into a new decentralized 
system”.7 
African continental organizations both the OAU and the AU 
involved in the issue and supported the self-determination of 
the Western Sahara. Generally, these organizations and Morocco 
have had opposite policies henceforth this situation created and 
further sustained the crisis in the continent. Due to these opposite 
claims and resolution demands, the Western Sahara issue cannot 
be solved. To put it in another way, self-determination cannot be 
implemented for decades. 
Morocco’s problematic relations with Africa’s continental 
framework add further tension and inhibits not only the resolution 
process of the Western Sahara conflict but also the functioning 
of this framework. Against the SADR’s membership to the OAU, 
Morocco withdrew from the Organization. It further “pledged to 
have the SADR suspended from the pan-African organization and 
swore that it will not sit in the same room as the SADR”.8 Yet, in 
2010s Rabat decided to be a member of the AU which revealed 
that Morocco wants to highlight some political dimensions of the 
Western Sahara issue rather than the legal ones due to the fact that 
these legal conditions accepted by the continental organization 
have remained unchanged. Henceforth reliance on this political 
dimension indicates that current process will sustain the conflict’s 
inclination towards a crisis.
6  S. J. Spector, “Negotiating Free Association between Western Sahara and Morocco: A 
Comparative Legal Analysis of Formulas for Self-Determination”, International Negotiation, 
6, 2011, p. 111.
7  Marina Ottaway, Morocco: “Advanced Decentralization” Meets the Sahara Autonomy 
Initiative, Woodrow Wilson Center, 27, May 2013, p. 1. 
8  Yasmine Hasnaoui, “Morocco and the African Union: A New Chapter for Western Sahara 
Resolution?”, Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies, 2017, p. 2.
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The OAU and Morocco: The Crisis Begins
The OAU and its stance on the Western Sahara issue were reasons 
for eruption of the crisis: Morocco’s policies and the OAU’s policies 
were contradictory and in the end Rabat decided to leave the 
Organization. To some, the Western Sahara conflict “undermined 
the stability”9 of the Organization.
The main purposes and principles of the OAU indicate its 
approach regarding the Western Sahara. According the Article II 
of the OAU Charter; defending sovereignty, territorial integrity 
and independence of African states; giving an end to all forms of 
colonialism in Africa, and promoting unity and solidarity of African 
states10 were guiding and founding principles. 
The OAU elaborated and recognized the Western Sahara conflict 
as a colonial issue henceforth a resolution had to be found and 
implemented according to self-determination rule accepted by 
the international law. In 1964, by supporting the Western Sahara’s 
decolonization the OAU gave its first sign of its involvement in the 
conflict.11 In October 1966 the OAU’s political committee called for 
the region’s independence. Moreover, Decolonization and Apartheid 
Decision (CM Res 206/XIII), taken by the Council of Ministers 
during its Thirteenth Ordinary Session in 1969 highlighted “the 
legitimacy of the struggle launched in…Spanish Sahara”12 and 
recommended its members to support materially, financially and 
diplomatically these kind of movements.13 Specially it underlined 
the fact that the people of the Spanish Sahara had inalienable right 
to self-determination in accordance to the UN General Assembly’s 
famous resolution 1514 (XV). Also it called Spain to implement the 
decolonization of the region.14 
9     Naldi, op. cit, p. 52.
10  “The OAU Charter”, African Union, https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7759-sl-
oau_charter_1963_0.pdf, (Date of Accession: 27.03.2016), p. 3.
11  Naldi, op.cit., p. 56. 
12  Sidi M. Omar, “OAU/AU and the Question of Western Sahara”, SADR Embassy to the 
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Referendum as a tool to proceed on the implementation of self-
determination of the people of Western Sahara15 is an example on 
the OAU’s stand on the Western Sahara issue because it always 
called for referendum. After Rabat revealed its desire to hold 
referendum, the OAU created the Implementation Committee with 
tasks of establishing ceasefire and conducting referendum.16 The Ad 
Hoc Committee that visited region made some recommendations 
that turned to be the Resolution 114 (XVI) in July 1979 at the 16th 
Session of the OAU Assembly. One of its recommendations was the 
Sahrawi peoples’ exercise of their self-determination right through 
referendum with two options: independence or maintenance of 
status quo.17 
Certain additional steps taken by the OAU have to be mentioned 
that can be recognized as indication of the Organization’s policies. 
The PF got the observer status18 in the OAU. Last but not least 
membership of the SADR to the OAU is an important example 
for the OAU’s policies especially on the implementation of self-
determination. In 1980, SADR made a move to solve the issue 
or to fasten the resolution process and applied to the OAU for 
membership.
However, since the start of the OAU-Moroccan institutional 
relations, discord based on opposing policies accompanied 
those relations. Due to her opposition to some clauses of the 
OAU’s Charter, Rabat made reservations for not being judicially 
responsible. It made reservation on the 3th Article and its third 
clause that was related with state sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the borders. The Kingdom’s reservation was based 
on “authentic borders” argument19 centered on historical rights 
and sovereignty over borders. In addition, Rabat put reservation 
to the Article 2(1). Regarding to both articles Morocco stated 
that its signing of the Charter could not be recognized neither as 
15  “Legal Opinion on the Request of the Kingdom of Morocco’s Admission into the AU”, 
Pambazuka News, https://www.pambazuka.org/pan-africanism/legal-opinion-request-
kingdom-moroccos-admission-au, (Date of Accession: 16.02.2017).
16  Naldi, op. cit., p. 63.
17  Naldi, op. cit., p. 61.
18  Naldi, op. cit., p. 59.
19  “Legal Opinion on the Request…”, loc. cit.
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“acknowledgement of the facts that Rabat refused to recognize nor 
as renunciation of the pursuit of its rights by the legitimate means 
at our disposal”.20 Rabat also aimed to prevent any interference 
from the OAU Charter, like changing of its borders, through putting 
respective clauses into its Constitution. According to the 42th 
Article of the Constitution “He (The King) is the Guarantor of the 
Independence of the country and of the territorial integrity of the 
Kingdom within its authentic borders”.21 
Furthermore, cessation of membership was a component to the 
strategy of Morocco’s relations with the OAU since her membership. 
After the OAU Liberation Committee’s recommendation to 
recognize the PF as the legitimate representative of the Sahrawi 
people Morocco and Mauritania replied by declaring their 
intentions about quitting the OAU.22 
SADR’s membership to the OAU facilitates current crisis’ 
analysis regarding the Western Sahara conflict and Morocco’s AU 
membership. One crucial issue to be underlined is the SADR’s 
legal capability to apply for membership. It acted according to 
the 28th Article of the OAU Charter: “Any independent sovereign 
African State may at any time notify the Secretary-General of-its 
intention to adhere or accede to this Charter”.23 A simple majority 
of the member states was required to get the admission.24 Thus, it 
can be said that secretary-general and simple majority of the OAU 
members perceived the SADR as a state.
In February 1982, the invitation on the membership to the 
Western Sahara was made by then Secretary-General25 and the 
SADR was accepted as the 51th member. In 1983, it was formally 
admitted as a member state26 and in spite of Morocco’s rejection, in 
20  Naldi, op. cit., p. 57.
21  “Legal Opinion on the Request…”, loc. cit.
22  Naldi, op. cit., p. 58.
23   “Charter of the Organization of the African Unity”, University of Minnesota Human Rights 
Library, http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/africa/OAU_Charter_1993.html, (Date of Accession: 
07.05.2016).
24  Guiseppe Schiavone, International Organizations: A Dictionary: Fourth Edition, MacMillan 
Press, London 1997, p. 219.
25  Pazzanita, op. cit, p. 135.
26  Legal Opinion on the Request…”, loc. cit.
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1984 the OAU recognized the SADR as a full member. 26 members 
that called for the SADR’s admission to the OAU recognized the 
Republic.27 By the year of 1985, 30 African states recognized the 
SADR. Not only for the OAU but also for certain states recognition 
of SADR was directly related with Morocco’s attitudes and policies 
regarding the resolution of conflict. For example, Rabat’s refusal 
to cooperate in holding referendum28 triggered recognition of the 
SADR. 
The OAU’s reasons to grant membership to the SADR can be 
analyzed along political and legal lines. The political aspect was 
directly linked to the Western Sahara issue because Morocco’s 
attitude and policies affected the Organization’s policies. For 
instance, Rabat recognized Algeria as a direct party to the conflict 
while the PF had no legal or international existence for the 
Kingdom.29 Thus, by deciding to grant membership the OAU wanted 
to demonstrate the actual parties of the conflict.30  
By granting membership to the SADR, the OAU might want to 
facilitate the resolution of the conflict.31 Rabat’s certain policies and 
activities like her unwillingness to conduct referendum triggered 
some states to support the SADR’s inclusion. 
Moreover, through the membership issue the OAU indicated 
Morocco the valid principles of the African institutional, political 
and legal framework directly related with mechanisms on 
resolution of the conflict. Hence, the OAU wanted to show Morocco 
and other possible “irredentist” African states that the borders left 
from the colonial states32 would be not changed and any alterations 
regarding borders would not be accepted.33 
27  Schiavone, loc. cit.
28  Naldi, op. cit., p. 65.
29  Pazzanita, op. cit.,  p. 153.
30  Ibid.
31  Ibid.
32  19th and 20th century formed the peak point of African colonialism. European states 
formalized the secession of Africa at 1884-85 Berlin Conference. For detailed information 
please check the Mehmet Seyfettin Erol-Oktay Bingöl, “Birinci Dünya Savaşı’nın Afrika’ya ve 
Sömürgeciliğe Etkileri”, Gazi Akademik Bakış, 7(14), Summer 2014, p. 177-196.
33  Pazzanita, op. cit., p. 152.
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The legal dimension of the Organization’s actions was directly 
linked to the core principles of the OAU. The right of self-
determination, territorial integrity and inviolability of borders of 
the colonial state were the fundamental concepts of the OAU that 
formed its legal, political framework.
The OAU might have valid reasons for SADR’s membership 
however not everyone supported this move and the situation 
caused tensions. In fact, admission of the SADR created huge 
divisions among conservative and progressive states that would 
nearly dissolve34 the OAU. Different and conflicting views among 
the members regarding the Western Sahara conflict manifested 
itself on voting procedure of the SADR’s admission. Algeria, 
Angola, Seychelles, Mozambique, Madagascar, Guinea-Bissau and 
Zimbabwe which supported the SADR’s membership; acclaimed 
that it was sufficient to get simple majority of the 50 members 
of the Assembly of the Head of States of the OAU. On the other 
hand, Morocco, the Ivory Coast, Senegal, Tunisia, Nigeria, Sudan 
and Sierra Leone acclaimed that two-third majority had to 
be maintained “to admit a state whose very existence was in 
question”.35
After SADR’s joining the OAU as a full member, the Organization 
continued to propose some solutions in accordance with the right 
of the self-determination. It provided several formulas, peace plans 
to end the conflict. They included components like establishing 
cease-fire, registration of voters of referendum and holding a 
referendum. Also, direct negotiations between Morocco and the PF 
would be started.
The AU and Morocco: The Crisis Transformed
With the foundation of the AU, the Western Sahara conflict and its 
related problems were transferred to this new organization. The 
concepts and principles of the OAU on the Western Sahara issue 
34  Naldi, op. cit., p. 56.
35  Schiavone, loc. cit.
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have been valid for the AU as well. The SADR due to its membership 
in the previous continental framework is founding member of the 
AU. Yet, Morocco by her own will remained outside the continental 
framework for nearly 33 years.
Within the current continental framework, the AU has been 
supporting the Western Sahara’s self-determination. Its’ principles 
and decisions have emphasized self-determination that have been 
in conformity with the SADR’s and the PF’s arguments. Like its 
predecessor, the AU has used referendum as a tool to implement 
the right of self-determination of the people of the Western Sahara. 
The AU has called both the UN General Assembly and the UN 
Security Council for conducting referendum in the Western Sahara. 
The foundation of the AU did not change Morocco’s attitude. The 
AU’s certain steps were not welcomed by Morocco. To give as an 
example, the Kingdom did not accept the AU’s decision to appoint a 
special envoy for the region.  To Morocco, her 2014’s refusal 
was based on nature of the AU’s authority regarding the issue. To 
Rabat, the AU “had no legal authority to intervene”36 in the Western 
Sahara conflict.
In spite of this opposition, Rabat somehow reversed its 
policies and applied for membership. The Kingdom has formally 
submitted its request for membership in September 2016; 
signed and ratified the Constitutive Act.37 According to the SADR’s 
statements, Morocco did not make any reservation in adopting the 
Constitutive Act.38 According to the Article 29 of the Constitutive 
Act, any African states can apply for membership.39 The state has to 
36  “Morocco Accuses African Union Chief in Obstructing Readmission”, Reuters,  http://
www.reuters.com/article/us-morocco-africa-idUSKBN13P22H, (Date of Accession: 
04.12.2016). 
37  “AU’s Shakespearean Morocco Dilemma: To Admit or not to Admit?”, Solomondersso, 
https://solomondersso.wordpress.com/2017/01/28/aus-shakespearean-morocco-
dilemma-to-admit-or-not-to-admit/, (Date of Accession: 16.02.2017).
38  “Morocco’s Adherence to AU Constitutive Act, Recognition of Sahrawi State”, Sahara 
Press Service, http://www.spsrasd.info/news/en/articles/2017/02/06/6972.html, (Date of 
Accession: 16.02.2017).
39  Article 29, “Constitutive Act of the African Union”, African Union, http://www.peaceau.
org/uploads/au-act-en.pdf, (Date of Accession: 05.02.2017), p. 13.
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notify the Chairman of the Commission of its “intention to accede 
to the Constitutive Act and to be admitted as a member of the 
Union”.40 According to Article 29/2, simple majority is needed to 
get admission. Majority of the 54 members had to approve Rabat’s 
inclusion; in another words 28 member states’ support would be 
sufficient. The voting was held in the summit of January 2017 and 
on 30 January 2017 the Kingdom joined the AU and became 55th 
member state. 39 member states voted in favor and 9 voted against 
Morocco’s inclusion; including Algeria and South Africa. 
The AU is not solely composed of Morocco and its supporters. 
That is to say the SADR and its allies criticized Morocco’s admission. 
According to the Foreign Minister of the SADR, Mohamed Salek 
Ould Salek, Morocco’s current status in the Western Sahara was 
occupier so the region was under the occupation that contradicted 
the founding principles of the AU. “The aim and essence of the 
Union is the liberation of Africa”41 hence to Salek the Kingdom 
cannot be member. To Salek, if Morocco wanted to be a member of 
the AU, then she had to “respect the rules”.42
The Kingdom’s inclusion process did not end easily. Some 
members wanted to postpone the vote. Certain members demanded 
to settle certain thorny issues of the Western Sahara conflict and 
the status of the SADR.43 For instance, a committee was proposed to 
decide borders between Morocco and the Western Sahara.44 It was 
mentioned that the continent’s several important states like South 
Africa and Algeria were against Morocco’s admission. To Algiers, it 
40 Ibid.
41 “Morocco ‘Should Not Rejoin African Union’”, BBC News, http://www.bbc.com/news/
world-africa-37941687, (Date of Accession: 29.11.2016).
42 Ibid.
43 Alonso Illueca-Sophocles Kitharidis, “The Impact of Morocco’s Admission to 
the African Union on the Dispute over the Western Sahara”, Opinio Juris, http://
o p i n i o j u r i s . o rg / 2 0 1 7 / 0 3 / 1 0 / i m p a c t - m o ro c c o s - a d m i s s i o n - a f r i c a n - u n i o n -
dispute-western-sahara/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_
campaign=Feed%3A+opiniojurisfeed+%28Opinio+Juris%29, (Date of Accession: 
17.05.2017).
44 Celeste Hicks, “Why did the African Union Readmit Morocco After Its 33 Years in the 
Cold?”, African Arguments, http://africanarguments.org/2017/02/02/how-did-morocco-
manage-to-rejoin-the-african-union-after-33-years-in-the-cold/, (Date of Accession: 
10.02.2017).
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has no problem with Morocco’s return to the AU however it has to 
be without preconditions.45  
Its application for membership also did not change Rabat’s 
stand. King Mohammed VI’s letter to the AU Summit in Rwanda 
indicated that Rabat continues to underlie political issues rather 
than legal dimensions of the Western Sahara conflict. Despite 
its quest for membership, Morocco insisted on its well-known 
arguments on the conflict that have been contradictory to the well-
established principles of the AU. For instance, in his letter to the 
AU members King Mohammed VI acclaimed that the region has 
“unshakeable Moroccan identity” and emphasized that the position 
on Western Sahara would not change.46 In the letter Morocco 
did not condition her membership on the SADR’s membership’s 
suspension. That is to say, in spite of the crisis Morocco had desire 
to be included in the Union.
The AU, since its foundation, as a continental framework, 
has championed unity among its members including the SADR. 
Moreover, due the status of the SADR and the impasse nature of 
the conflict, the Organization has had an important role in this 
process. Thus, Morocco’s membership and its related process 
further highlight the AU’s role as it has two members that do not 
recognize each other and have opposite suggestions that do not 
solve problem. This situation may disaffect functioning and related 
policies of the AU especially on the Western Sahara. The main 
indicator is that Morocco and some of its allies within the AU try to 
terminate the SADR’s membership. It can be said that the Moroccan 
membership transformed the existing crisis into an acute one.
Divorce in the “complete” union: expelling of the SADR 
Admission of Morocco to the AU membership reveals existence of 
“the Cold War” within the AU: a member is wanted to be expelled 
45  Ayah Aman, “Why Morocco Really Wants Back in the African Union?”, Al-Monitor, https://
www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/07/morocco-join-african-union-western-
sahara-dispute-egypt.html, (Date of Accession: 05.08.2016).
46  “King Mohammed VI: Morocco Wants to Take Back its Natural Position in Africa”, Middle 
East Online, http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=79660, (Date of Accession: 
30.11.2016).
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from the AU due to the admission of a new member. These 
conflicting views like expelling a member from the AU can also 
be seen in member states’ policies regarding recognition of the 
SADR. This situation reveals the political dimension of the Western 
Sahara issue and indicates that crisis still continues to be in the 
continental framework. For instance, Senegal’s actions regarding 
admission of both the SADR and Morocco underscore the fact that 
certain members of the continental structure do not hesitate to stir 
some tension in the already formed crisis atmosphere. And also, it 
provides some clue on political dimension of the Western Saharan 
conflict giving the continental groups’ attitude and positions of 
some member states. After Rabat’s request for admission to the 
AU, Senegal attempted to revoke SADR’s membership, but it failed. 
Moreover, Dakar pursued similar policies in the process of the 
SADR’s admission to the OAU. At that time to Senegal, Morocco’s 
decision to withdraw from the OAU was justified because SADR’s 
admission was a “legal heresy” and it was not even a sovereign 
state.47 
After Morocco’s request, 28 countries signed a declaration for 
the suspension of the SADR’s AU membership. These states were 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde, Comoros, Congo, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Eritrea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Liberia, Libya, Central African Republic, 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sao Tome, Senegal, 
Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Eswatini (Swaziland), 
Togo, Zambia.48 It was claimed that Tunisia, Niger, Mali supported 
the idea, but they did not sign the document.49 Algeria criticized 
those steps on the ground that the SADR was a founding member 
of the AU.50 The letter was submitted to the then-AU Chairman 
47  “Africa: Senegal Faults SADR’s Admission into the OAU”, All Africa, http://allafrica.com/
stories/199908100184.html, (Date of Accession: 26.06.2017).
48  “28 African Countries Call on the Immediate Suspension of the SADR”, Submit Press 
Release 123, https://newsreleases.submitpressrelease123.com/2016/07/20/28-african-
countries-call-on-the-immediate-suspension-of-the-sadr/, (Date of Accession: 18.08.2016).
49  Ann Marie Wainscott, “Morocco’s AU Bid Builds on Years of Strategic Diplomacy”, IPI 
Global Observatory, https://theglobalobservatory.org/2016/07/morocco-african-union-
western-sahara-mohammed-vi/, (Date of Accession: 18.08.2016). 
50  “SADR, a Founding Member of AU, Its Suspension cannot be Requested”, Sahara Press 
Service, http://www.spsrasd.info/news/en/articles/2016/07/21/3185.html, (Date of 
Accession: 18.08.2016).
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Idris Debby and asked “him to take legal action to suspend SADR’s 
membership, to enable the AU to contribute to the United Nations’ 
efforts to solve the regional dispute”.51
Due to the crisis the AU needed to make some clarification on 
expulsion of a member. The AU Commission stated that “the AU 
Constitutive Act does not have any provision for the expulsion of 
any Member State of the Union”.52 
Morocco’s admission brings several subjects related with 
the AU’s membership: suspension or cessation of the SADR’s 
membership. However, apart from political dimension issue of 
expelling/revoking of membership has to be elaborated in legal 
terms as well. According to the 30th Article of the AU’s Constitutive 
Act, the sole condition for suspension is coming to power of a 
government of the concerned state through unconstitutional 
means.53 In that case the state should not be allowed to participate 
in the activities of the Union. Since this Article is not related with 
the SADR it cannot be implemented.
Cessation of membership is another subject regarding 
membership status, but again it is not related with the SADR for 
the time being. Cessation of membership is the member state’s 
willingly renouncing its membership. According to 31st Article a 
written notification given to the Chairman of the Commission will 
be enough to end membership.54
 To put it in another words, the AU “has no jurisdiction to 
derecognize or suspend a member”.55 However, if a clause on 
expulsion of a member is accepted and if the Constitutive Act 
changes, then probability of terminating the SADR’s membership 
will be emerged. According to the 32th Article amendments or 
51  Aman, loc. cit.
52  “Morocco did not Attend or Address the 27th AU Summit in Kigali, Rwanda”, AU’S 
Directorate of Information And Communication, Press Release Nº26/27TH AU SUMMIT, 
http://www.usc.es/export9/sites/webinstitucional/gl/institutos/ceso/descargas/AU_
AUC-press-release-Morocco_25-07-16_en.pdf, (Date of Accession: 20.08.2016).
53  Article 30, op. cit.
54  Article 31, op. cit. 
55  Hasnaoui, op. cit, p. 12.
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revisions “shall be adopted by the Assembly by consensus or, failing 
which, by a two-thirds majority” and then all member states have 
to ratify these amendments or revisions.56 To revoke the SADR’s 
membership Rabat must has the support of the AU’s 28 states.57
Even before her admission, relations between Morocco and the 
AU got tense during the related process. For instance, the Kingdom 
acclaimed that the AU interfered in its admission process. To the 
Kingdom, the Organization delayed sending of its request to the 
AU’s members. Morocco’s Foreign Ministry claimed that Dlamini-
Zuma, then-head of the AU Commission, tried to thwart Morocco’s 
decision to be a member. Therefore, Rabat’s inclusion created some 
problems which resulted in tension within the AU. 
There have been other signs which indicate Morocco’s inclusion 
might complicate functioning of the AU especially regarding 
the Western Sahara issue. By not attending the 668th meeting of 
the AU’s Peace and Security Council on the situation in Western 
Sahara on 20 March 2017 Rabat “violated the provisions of the 
AU Constitutive Act and the PSC Protocol”.58 Morocco was called to 
“extend necessary cooperation in conformity with the provisions 
of the AU Charter and the PSC Protocol”.59
Problems for the AU: possible signs of the acute crisis in 
the future
As one can easily imagine the Western Sahara issue will be the 
determinant factor on relations between the AU and Rabat. It can 
be tense and further signs of acute crisis may be seen in the future 
that Rabat has to clarify its stance on the continent’s politics and 
56 Article 32, op. cit.
57 Samir Bennis, “Morocco should Return to the African Union”, The New Arab, https://
www.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2016/8/8/morocco-should-return-to-the-african-
union, (Date of Accession: 19.08.2016).
58 Erica Mumford, “The African Union’s Role in Western Sahara’s Claim of Independence”, 
http://www.adelphi.edu/wp-content/blogs.dir/451/files/2017/06/Erica-Mumford-word.
pdf?t=1498151399-187003-a, p. 16, (Date of Accession: 20.09.2017).
59 “Communiqué”, 668th Peace and Security Council Meeting, http://www.peaceau.org/
uploads/psc-comm-western-sahara-en.pdf, (Date of Accession: 18.05.2017), p. 2.
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its recognition of the AU’s role. The factors that will sustain crisis 
are still valid in spite of Morocco’s admission so political and legal 
credibility problem for the AU is emerged.
First and foremost, no conditions set by the AU for Morocco’s 
admission. Apart from the Constitutive Act, no political and 
legal burdens were put on Morocco. In return, also the Kingdom 
accepted that it would put no condition60 and reservation61 for its 
accession to the AU. Although Algeria and South Africa attempted 
to put certain conditions for Morocco’s re-entrance into the 
continental institutional framework, like recognition of the SADR 
and on formation of a committee to examine the admission 
process62 Morocco was condition-free in its admission to the AU.
Although Morocco readmitted to the Union with no compliance 
to the AU’s decisions on Western Sahara, at least for now she made 
and also gained some “concessions”. The SADR has been a member 
of the AU, and has had a seat within the AU. On the other hand, 
Rabat’s admission can be recognized as a step back for the SADR 
due to the fact that Morocco joined the club without recognizing 
the Republic. However, to the SADR, as Morocco being within the 
borders of legitimacy of the continental organization, the AU can 
take some steps to implement referendum in order to make Rabat 
and the SADR work together.63
Another problem that questions the AU’s legal and political 
credibility is whether Rabat will accept the AU’s role in Western 
Sahara conflict. Morocco argued that the AU has not been neutral 
in the Western Sahara issue64 so it cannot participate in the 
related negotiations. The AU’s role is questioned arguing that the 
Organization has no legal basis, political role and moral legitimacy 
60 “Morocco Rejoins African Union without Conditions”, Middle East Online, http://www.
middle-east-online.com/english/?id=81293, (Date of Accession: 11.02.2017).
61 “Communiqué”, loc. cit.
62 Samir Bennis, “Morocco Rejoining AU is a Boon to the Continent”, The New Arab, https://
www.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2017/1/31/morocco-rejoining-au-is-a-boon-to-the-
continent, (Date of Accession: 19.03.2017).
63 Hicks, loc. cit.
64 Mumford, op. cit., p. 15.
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to intervene. Such a “recognition” indicates that both the AU and 
Morocco were aware of the fact that silent crisis might be resulted 
in bigger crisis with conclusion of Morocco’s admission process. 
Another problem for the AU and the Kingdom is that they have 
different solutions for the Western Sahara issue. As a member, it 
is expected from the Kingdom to apply articles of the Constitutive 
Act. Some examples can be given which are directly related with 
the Western Sahara issue. The SADR is a full member state, then its 
borders have to be accepted. Article 4 (b) of the Constitutive Act of 
the African Union, underscores the respect of borders existing on 
achievement of independence65 namely uti possidetis.
Morocco will be tested whether it apply the rules on peaceful 
resolution of the Western Sahara conflict and the AU’s Assembly 
decisions. According to the Constitutive Act’s 4th Article and the e 
clause appropriate means for peaceful resolution of conflicts among 
member states may be decided by the Assembly.66 The AU’s stand 
on the Western Sahara issue is based on the self-determination 
of the Sahrawi people through conducting referendum with the 
independency option. Also, the AU recognizes the region as the 
non-self-governing territory and seeking to protect its integrity.67
Self-determination, last but not the least, may stir up tension 
dependent upon Morocco’s actions. Nevertheless, Morocco’s and 
the AU’s stands on self-determination will collide. The latter’s 
perception of self-determination is based on protecting territorial 
integrity and inviolability of borders.  It is based on colonial state 
and on the notion of people. Moreover, the documents of the UN, the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR) contains 
the right of self-determination. It has a peculiar role that can be 
seen in the Constitutive Act of the AU. Its 3/h article mentions that 
one of the objectives of the AU is to “promote and protect human 
and peoples’ rights in accordance with the ACHPR and other 
65 “Constitutive Act of the African Union”, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, http://www.achpr.org/instruments/au-constitutive-act/#3, (Date of Accession: 
19.04.2017).
66 Ibid.
67 “Communiqué”, op. cit., p. 1.
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relevant human rights instruments”.68 Thus, the AU can continue to 
bring the human rights concept into the Western Sahara conflict; 
as it has sought for human rights monitoring in the Western Sahara 
and in the refugee camps.69
Referendum would be a conflicted subject as well. According 
to the 2017 Communiqué of the AU Peace and Security Council, 
the AU still calls for the referendum. It calls for taking necessary 
measures and setting time for conducting referendum for the self-
determination of people of the Western Sahara in compliance with 
relevant decisions of the UN, the OAU and the AU.70 In the process 
of Western Sahara conflict’s resolution, referendum has been a 
thorny issue that parties to the conflict cannot find common way 
to deal with. For instance, they have had different proposals on 
the number and identity of the voters. Nearly 130.000 Moroccan 
settlers’ inclusion into voters list has been the main problem so the 
PF and Rabat cannot reach to a solution on who will cast vote on 
referendum. Also based on its autonomy plan Morocco acclaims 
that conducting referendum will no longer be a realistic option.
The AU like its predecessor accepts the SADR as its member. 
However, Morocco and some members do not recognize the SADR 
as an independent state and hence as a member state. This is the 
most important question to be answered: How these two opposite 
attitudes conform to each other within the AU? Different states 
have opposing and changing positions on the Western Sahara as 
well. The most important device to comprehend African states’ 
attitude on the Western Sahara especially on self-determination 
has been recognition of the SADR. Out of 54 members, 3871 member 
states of the AU including Algeria, Ethiopia, Nigeria and South 
Sudan recognize the SADR. 
68  Constitutive Act of the African Union, loc. cit.
69  “Press Release: African Union Special Envoy for Western Sahara, H.E. Former President 
Joaquim Chissano Conducts Consultations on Western Sahara in Geneva, Switzerland”, 
African Union, http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/press-release-au-special-envoy-mission-
geneva-feb-2017.pdf, (Date of Accession: 18.05.2017). 
70  “Communiqué”, loc. cit.
71  Illueca-Kitharidis, loc. cit.
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Morocco’s support to several states has affected their stand 
on the Western Sahara issue. Before Morocco’s admission some 
members of the AU pursued certain policies that questioned their 
position and nature of the Western Sahara conflict. These states 
changed their policies on the recognition of the SADR. Some 
African states withhold recognition, some recognized the SADR 
again. In another words, certain African states have provided 
several conditions for the maintenance and even for the escalation 
of crisis in the Western Sahara conflict. Kenya recognized the SADR 
in 2005, however in 2006 she suspended its diplomatic relations 
and in 2007 after Moroccan Foreign Minister Mohammed Benaissa 
visit72 it froze its recognition. But when it comes to the year of 2014 
Nairobi decided to open the SADR’s embassy and so the bilateral 
relations restarted.73 Malawi is an another interesting example 
regarding its relation with the SADR. In 1994 it recognized the 
Republic, but changed its policies six times74 and then finally in 
2014 Malawi decided to restart bilateral relations with the SADR.
Rabat has established cooperative relations dominantly on 
security and economics with several African states that brings 
other states’ political influence and interference regarding the 
process of Western Sahara conflict’s resolution. Henceforth the 
crisis for the AU regarding Western Sahara includes other members. 
Rabat has referred to threat of secession in the continent through 
making comparison with the Sahrawi nationalistic struggle and 
other nationalist/self-determination movements. Moreover, the 
King took several steps to “guarantee” his country’s admission as 
well. For instance, he made “countless visits to sub-Saharan Africa, 
signing nearly 1,000 cooperation agreements since 2000”.75 For 
example, Tanzania, where the King Mohammed VI paid an official 
72  “Kenya Freezes Recognition of SADR”, Autonomy Plan, http://autonomy-plan.org/57-
kenya-freezes-recognition-of-sadr.html, (Date of Accession: 08.04.2014).
73  “Opening of Sahrawi Embassy in Nairobi”, Sahara Press Service, http://www.spsrasd.
info/en/content/opening-saharawi-embassy-nairobi, (Date of Accession: 08.04.2014).
74  “Malawi Withdraws its Recognition of the so-Called SADR”, Sahara Online, http://www.
sahara-online.net/Western-Sahara/Malawi-withdraws-its-recognition-of-the-so-called-
SADR--1306-2452-3916.aspx, (Date of Accession: 08.04.2014).
75  Hicks, loc. cit.
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visit in 2016 declared that she supported Rabat’s claims in the 
Western Sahara conflict.76
The AU members’ contradictory positions on the Western 
Sahara indicate the crisis has political, strategic and to some extent 
ideological77 dimensions. Certain Africa’s “heavyweight” countries 
like South African Republic and Algeria have supported the PF and 
so the self-determination of the Western Sahara in conjunction 
with the universally accepted principles of international law. To 
Pretoria, not recognizing the SADR would be contradictory to the 
South African Republic’s historical struggle, the UN Charter and 
the African Union’s Constitutive Act.78 
The SADR and its allies have highlighted the fact that its 
territory has been under the Moroccan occupation so that “the 
paramount clauses” of the Constitutive Act like decolonization, 
territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence are breached 
with Rabat’s inclusion to the AU. The third and fourth articles, for 
example, include territorial integrity, respect of borders and non-
interference in internal affairs of a member state. Henceforth to 
the SADR, as the Kingdom became 55th member of the AU then 
Rabat is ready to accept and implement the AU’s related decisions 
on resolution of the conflict. The most important legal document 
that the SADR mainly relies on is the Constitutive Act. Due to the 
fact that as Morocco being a member must accept and must be 
ready to implement the Charter. The Kingdom’s adoption of the 
Constitutive Act without reservations indirectly, implicitly means 
the Kingdom’s acceptance of the AU’s way of resolution of the 
conflict and thus recognition of the SADR. To the Sahrawis, now 
76 Alpha Kamara, “Morocco Continues AU Moves with Senegal Visit”, Anadolu Agency, 
http://aa.com.tr/en/africa/morocco-continues-au-moves-with-senegal-visit/680241, 
(Date of Accession: 19.11.2016).
77 Ideology is a notion and belief system which helps us to understand the world we live in.
For detailed information about idology please refer to Mehmet Seyfettin Erol-Emre Ozan, 
“Dış Politika'da İdolojinin Rolü”, Ertan Efegil-Mehmet Seyfettin Erol, ed., Dış Politik Analizinde 
Teorik Yaklaşımlar: Türk Dış Politikası Örneği, Barış Kitap, Ankara 2012, p. 350.
78 R. S. Clark, “Chapter 4: Western Sahara and the United Nations Norms on Self-
Determination and Aggression”, Karin Arts-Pedro Pinto Leite, ed., International Law and the 
Question of Western Sahara, International Platform of Jurists for East Timor, Leiden 2007, 
p. 12.
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Morocco has to end “its occupation of the Sahrawi territories”79 
because the Kingdom accessed to the AU in compliance with the 
Organization’s conditions.
Conclusion
Analyzing relations and silent-then-turned acute crisis between 
Morocco and the African Union compels exploring not only 
political but also legal aspects of the Western Sahara conflict and 
the AU’s functioning. Political and legal facts created the issue, later 
they resulted in emergence of crisis and now they transformed 
the old/silent conflict to the new/acute conflict predominantly 
through Morocco’s joining the AU. Decolonization is the solution to 
the Western Sahara conflict, but it cannot be implemented. Some 
articles of the Constitutive Act or other important legal documents 
that shape functioning of the AU have been generally in opposition 
to Morocco’s position and politics regarding the Western Sahara 
issue.
Through accepting Morocco’s membership application and 
lately readmitting it, the AU might try to find a response to 
Western Sahara issue or to soften policies of the parties to the 
conflict. As Morocco and the SADR have been a member of the 
same organization then it may be assumed that the solution can 
be found. However, the AU could not find solution to the political 
crisis and instead it created a brand new and a legal crisis from a 
silent crisis. As of today, the occupier state and the occupied state 
are in the same institution.
For this reason, to facilitate Morocco’s inclusion, the AU did not 
put any condition on Rabat that would compel her to change her 
position on the Western Sahara. The AU has rested on political 
arena without touching the legal aspects. The AU without putting 
conditions for Rabat’s inclusion wants the Kingdom to be a 
member and continuation of the impasse in the Western Sahara 
conflict. On the other hand, to the AU the Western Sahara conflict 
79  “Morocco’s adherence to…”, loc. cit.
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might be solved within the AU. Conditioning might further result 
in other parties’ of the conflict putting their own that certainly will 
give damage to the AU.
According to some AU members the Western Sahara is under 
Moroccan occupation, and yet the occupier state and the occupied 
state are in the same Organization. The AU may succeed in finding 
resolution acceptable to both members or may face serious 
constraints to its legal and political credibility.
However, the future remains uncertain especially for the AU. 
The Kingdom does not hesitate to state that the AU has no legal 
authority to intervene in the Western Sahara conflict. Thus, some 
legal issues will test whether or not Morocco and the AU conform 
to each other. Also, the credibility of the Organization is and will 
be questioned. If Rabat breaches the Constitutive Act, it will create 
tension among the AU and its members. 
Moreover, there has been the possibility of restarting armed 
struggle. If the current impasse on the Western Sahara conflict 
continues than crisis may be transformed into a new wave of 
armed struggle. From time to time, several declarations are made 
by the PF in taking armed struggle into its agenda again.80
The Western Sahara issue because of Morocco’s demand of 
membership becomes a crisis for the continental framework again. 
However, till this day it has not caused any hot or actual crisis that 
ceased functioning of the AU, threatened seriously membership of 
both the SADR and Morocco. Actually, the Western Sahara conflict 
has reflected a crisis based on membership of Morocco and/or the 
SADR. Former’s decision to leave the OAU, later its demand to be 
readmitted indicate such phenomenon. 
80  “Polisario Vows to Return to ‘Armed Resistance’ in Response to Moroccan King’s Speech”, 
Middle East Monitor, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/africa/15196-polisario-
vows-to-return-to-armed-resistance-in-response-to-moroccan-kings-speech, (Date of 
Accession: 29.12.2019).
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Now Morocco is an AU member, but the number of the member 
states or the African states has not been clear yet; 54 or 55? It is 
questionable that through readmitting Morocco the African Union 
becomes a complete union. The African Union does not mean the 
union of Africa, but Africa’s unity. The Western Sahara conflict still 
continues and its effect on the AU as a party of crisis is still valid. 
It is revealed more than once that there has been a division among 
the AU’s members on resolution of the Western Sahara. To some of 
its members, the Western Sahara conflict has political answer but 
to the AU it has legal and concrete answer. The continent as a whole 
has not had exactly same policies, the AU’s or the OAU’s decisions 
have not reflected positions of its 55 members. This new process 
also indicates first sign of a new and acute crisis as some members 
wanted to expel the SADR from the AU. Membership issue with its 
quit and readmission dilemma has been detrimental to the union 
of Africa.
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